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CASS R. SUNSTEIN*
I am grateful to the editors of the Journal for inviting me to reply to
Professor Chevigny's thoughtful response' to my essay in these pages.2 I
find myself in agreement with much of Professor Chevigny's argument.
A purely Cartesian account of human thought would indeed be hard to
sustain. Human beings do not approach problems linearly or through
propositions alone. Drives, selective empathy and identification, heuris-
tics of various sorts, prior experience'and beliefs, desires, recognizable
patterns, and various verbal and nonverbal cues also play a crucial role.
Moreover, much speech with noncognitive components is entitled to the
highest degree of constitutional protection. Political speech, for example,
frequently appeals to the heart as well as to the head. The fact that an
appeal is emotionally loaded is hardly a good reason to allow the govern-
ment to control it.
Notwithstanding these points, it would, I think, be a mistake to
abandon the view that some narrowly defined categories of speech-
threats, involuntary hypnosis, and most notably, for present purposes,
pornography-merit less than the usual protection, and precisely because
of the way these kinds of speech communicate their "message." My
claim comes in two simple parts. (1) Some narrowly drawn categories of
speech may be regulated on the basis of a lesser showing of harm-a
proposition that is in fact a staple of current first amendment doctrine.
(2) To decide whether speech falls within those categories, it is relevant
whether the material in question appeals to cognitive or noncognitive ca-
pacities. I arrive at this conclusion through two different routes.
First: I think Professor Chevigny overstates his case. The distinc-
tion between cognitive and noncognitive speech is not "dangerously inco-
herent."' 3 Indeed, Professor Chevigny's own terms suggest that he
believes that the distinction is intelligible, at least in the important sense
that it is possible to identify polar cases. For example, he distinguishes
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between "the most professorial" and the "most 'intuitive' ,,;4 between
"propagandistic persuasion" and other kinds of thought;5 between
"prejudgments ... in patterns" and "logic"; 6 between "arous[al]" and
"abstract" argument. 7 To be sure, Professor Chevigny often invokes
these distinctions to suggest that they are less crisp and clear than we
normally recognize-a claim I accept-but it is hard to read his essay
without getting the sense that it would be difficult indeed to proceed
without distinctions of this general sort. For this reason, Professor
Chevigny's colleague is on to something true and important when she
says, in response to his essential argument, that what makes pornography
different is that people "get off on it." But more on this below.
More fundamentally, the proposition that "our judgments [appear]
'detached' or contemplative, but they are as much rooted in our prejudg-
ments as are snap decisions," 9 is not merely a counsel of despair. This
proposition-to which I very much doubt Professor Chevigny entirely
subscribes-is also antithetical to the basic logic of a system of free ex-
pression, which places a high premium on the process of discussion and
deliberation among people with different views. If judgments, contem-
plative judgments, snap judgments, and prej.dgments are essentially all
one, it will not be easy to specify the sorts of values our system of free
speech should serve. Indeed, common practices of deliberation, commu-
nication, change in perspective, and learning will be hard to sustain.
In any case, Professor Chevigny's effort to collapse the distinction
between the cognitive and noncognitive is emphatically not the lesson of
the various writings on which he relies. Those writings convey no single
message, but make a variety of quite distinct claims, some of them funda-
mentally at odds with Professor Chevigny's position. Either separately
or together, they do not support Professor Chevigny's effort to collapse
the distinction between reasoned judgments and bare intuition. 10
4. Id. at 424.
5. Id. at 426.
6. Id. at 428.
7. Id. at 430.
8. Id. at 428.
9. Id. at 427; see also id. at 426 ("We cannot escape from our stereotypes through 'rationality'
or 'detachment' because they are the principal tools we have."). The same position-a form of
conventionalism--can be found in S. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989); it is criti-
cized in Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. - (forthcoming
1989).
10. The various writings by Tversky, Kahneman, and others deal principally with heuristics
that people use in evaluating probabilities. JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, A. Tversky eds. 1982). Their goal is to show how rationality
breaks down, or is compromised, in different settings; they do not identify the snap decision with the
considered judgment, or suggest that the cognitive/noncognitive distinction is incoherent. Indeed,
the exact opposite is true: the introduction to the very volume on which Professor Chevigny relies
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An effort to collapse the distinction between the cognitive and
noncognitive would also be wildly untrue to human experience, in which
prejudgments and uninformed intuitions are subject to various forms of
testing and reassessment during the process of making a decision."1  The
most obvious examples here involve means-end rationality of the simplest
sort, in which people ask themselves whether a particular course of
action will in fact produce the goals they seek, or whether there are
superior alternatives. It would be peculiar to denigrate the role of
"logic" here, and snap judgments are often reassessed. Modern social
science, moreover, has provided extremely helpful information on such
issues.12 The cognitive testing of prejudgments occurs in other contexts
as well. Values themselves emerge partly through a process of
deliberation.
All this suggests that the distinction between the cognitive and
noncognitive is not incoherent; we can distinguish between forms of ex-
pression based on their appeal to different capacities. To say this is not
to deny that communication frequently involves noncognitive elements, 13
and it is not to claim that communication is ever purely cognitive or that
the presence of noncognitive elements removes speech from first amend-
ment protection. 14 Indeed, the cognitive/noncognitive distinction should
arise only infrequently in first amendment cases, as in fact it does. 15 But
the question remains whether first amendment doctrine ought to treat
some forms of speech-threats, assaults, some pornography--differently
says that some such heuristics "lead to severe and systematic errors." Id. at 3. A considered judg-
ment necessarily depends on a belief in logic, and that belief underlies most of the modern work in
social psychology on heuristics and biases. See also J. ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS ch. 1
(1989) (discussing breakdowns in rationality).
I cannot deal with Professor Chevigny's various other sources in this space, but one of the
mistakes in his analysis, I think, is to take what is an essentially descriptive work about mental
processes-showing various cognitive breakdowns and complexities-as support for the quite differ-
ent claim that moral or constitutional theory ought not to distinguish between the cognitive and the
noncognitive, or that such a distinction is "incoherent." Chevigny, supra note 1, at 422.
11. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-51 (1971) (discussing reflective equilibrium, the
state reached "after a person has weighed various proposed conceptions and he has either revised his
judgments to accord with one of them or held fast to his initial convictions (and the corresponding
conception)). Education in general, including legal education, involves precisely these sorts of
processes. See M. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LuCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK
TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY (1985).
12. Thus, for example, regulation of the environment and of occupational safety and health-
not to mention pornography-should be based on a careful understanding of the likely effects of
different enforcement strategies. See, eg., Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics-and
the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 354-60 (1988) (well-informed policy analysis demon-
strates that occupational safety and health regulations poorly achieve democratic government's goals
of redistribution and aid to working people).
13. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 606 & n.101.
14. Id. at 605-08.
15. See, eg., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1967).
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from others because of the way they communicate their message; and it is
to this question to which I now turn.
Second: Those interpreting the first amendment must distinguish
between activities that count as "speech" and those that do not. That
task is hard enough, but a system of free expression must also distinguish
between speech that is and is not central to the purposes of the free
speech guarantee. This latter task-to set out categories of "low value"
and "high value" expression-is crucial to modern first amendment doc-
trine; indeed, judge-made doctrine could hardly function without it.16
Unless I misread him, Professor Chevigny's approach would make it
difficult or impossible to distinguish between activities that count as
speech and activities that do not; his approach also would make it hard
to distinguish between low- and high-value speech. I am confident that
Professor Chevigny would not claim that a long look at a rock formation,
a visit to a prostitute, or a summer vacation in Paris, count as constitu-
tionally protected speech-but all of these activities are subject to pre-
cisely the same sorts of mental intermediation that Professor Chevigny
treats as characteristic to all forms of speech. If so, Professor Chevigny
will be forced either to assimilate a quite dazzling range of activity to the
category of constitutionally protected speech-an implausible innova-
tion, I think, on existing doctrine-or to rely on the discredited and un-
tenable distinction between "speech" and "conduct."' 7
In brief, the first amendment makes it necessary to identify the dis-
tinctive characteristics entitling "speech," and not other forms of human
experience, to constitutional protection. Any approach that refuses to
undertake such a task will be at best incomplete and more likely a mud-
dle. And any approach that does undertake this task will probably con-
clude that speech is protected at least partly because it involves
cognition. In the public realm, cognition-understood to involve deliber-
ative capacities of a wide-ranging sort-provides a central clue to the
American commitment to self-government through political processes;
and it is here that a central purpose of the first amendment can be
found.' However oversimplified the Enlightenment understanding of
16. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 602-05.
17. There might be a third alternative here, but I am unable to think of it.
18. See, ag., A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 112 (1980) (must minimize assessment of message's
danger if first amendment is to serve its central function of ensuring open political process and
dialogue).
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these problems might be, I remain unconvinced that a sensible system of
free expression must treat violent pornography in the same way that it
treats political speech, or the works of Albert Einstein. 19
19. Chevigny, supra note 1, at 423-24.
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